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THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM: POTENTIAL
DRIVERS OF THE NEXT MAJOR COMMUNICATIONS STATUTE
Christopher S. Yoo1 & Tiffany Keung2
ABSTRACT
Although most studies of major communications reform legislation focus
on the merits of their substantive provisions, analyzing the political dynamics that
led to the enactment of such legislation can yield important insights. An
examination of the tradeoffs that led the major industry segments to support the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides a useful illustration of the political
bargain that it embodies. Application of a similar analysis to the current context
identifies seven components that could form the basis for the next
communications statute: universal service, pole attachments, privacy,
intermediary immunity, net neutrality, spectrum policy, and antitrust reform.
Determining how these components might fit together requires an assessment of
areas in which industry interests overlap and diverge as well as aspects of the
political environment that can make passage of reform legislation more difficult.
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INTRODUCTION

When the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was signed into law, it was hailed as an
extraordinary feat of legislation.3 Signed amid unusual fanfare after a deliberative process that
spanned many years, this comprehensive legislative reform was the product of bipartisan
cooperation achieved during a time of unusually strong partisan acrimony. 4
Such an unusual achievement offers potential lessons for what might lead to the next
great communications statute. Although most of the other contributions of this symposium have
focused on the impact of the 1996 Act’s substantive provisions, we would like to focus on the
political dynamics surrounding its enactment. Part II analyzes the 1996 Act as a political deal
among the leading commercial and political interest groups. Part III outlines how the major
components of the 1996 Act have faded over time, while other aspects regarded as minor ended

3. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 188, 188 (Feb. 8,
1996) calling the 1996 Act “landmark legislation [that] fulfills my Administration’s promise to reform our
telecommunications laws”). President Clinton reportedly called it the most significant piece of legalization he
signed. Larry Pressler, Politics and Telecommunications, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 555, 555 (2006).
4. Harold Furchtgott-Roth & Arielle Roth, Answering Four Questions on the Anniversary of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 68 FED. COMM. L.J. 83, 85-88 (2016).

2

up having more lasting importance, and explores what issues might form the basis for a new
compact capable of generating support from the key constituencies. Part IV examines
opportunities for potential alignment and political quid pro quo as well as potential obstacles to
closing such a deal.
II.

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 AS A POLITICAL BARGAIN
The primary focus of the 1996 Act was to break down the regulatory barriers that kept

local telephone service, long distance telephone service, and cable television in separate and
distinct technological siloes.5 In return for authorizing their entry into other markets, each
segment also had to agree to two broad tradeoffs: allowing other types of firms into their markets
and being subjected to some degree of regulatory oversight. 6 The quid pro quo aspects of the
1996 Act have all the makings of a classic political bargain. 7
Like all major legislation, the 1996 Act was to some extent the product of factors unique
to its time. For example, it arose during a period of strong bipartisan support for deregulation that
began during the Reagan years and continued at least through the Clinton Administration. 8 In

5. Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 3, at 188 (“The Act opens up
competition between local telephone companies, long distance providers, and cable companies . . ..”); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 857-58 (1997) (“The major components of the statute . . . were designed to promote
competition in the local telephone service market, the multichannel video market, and the market for over-the-air
broadcasting.”).
6. CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 33034, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT: COMPETITION,
INNOVATION, AND REFORM 10 (2007) (noting that “[t]he general objective of the 1996 Act was to open up markets
to competition” while also discussing new obligations imposed on incumbents and new carriers—such as
requirements to interconnect their networks with one another and guidelines on intercarrier compensation rates).
7. This path has been paved by other scholars. See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy
of Telecommunications Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835 (1997); Furchtgott-Roth & Roth, supra note 4, at 84-88;
Matthew Spitzer, Dean Krattenmaker’s Road Not Taken: The Political Economy of Broadcasting in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 353 (1996).
8. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124 (reporting
Congress’s intent to “provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate
rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all
Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition”). See generally Joseph P. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (1998)
(characterizing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as the archetypical example of the shift away from regulatory
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addition, frustrations with Judge Harold Greene’s more than decade-long supervision of the
decree that broke up AT&T helped fuel calls for legislative reform. 9
These factors, while important, would not be sufficient to support the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 unless all the major segments of the industry received
sufficient benefits to convince them to lend their backing. Although we cannot go into every
detail of a statute that is 107 pages long, 10 the outlines of the deal are relatively clear.
A.

TELEPHONY

Perhaps the most important provisions of the 1996 Act were those relating to telephony. 11
The Act’s primary benefit to the local Bell Operating Companies was the authorization for them
to begin selling long distance once they had opened their local telephone markets to
competition.12 At the same time, the Act authorized local telephone companies, (called local
exchange carriers (LECs)), to begin offering cable television service by repealing the statutory
provision prohibiting telephone companies from offering cable television service. 13 It also

oversight toward competition and maximization of consumer choice across six industries: railroads, airlines, trucks,
telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas).
9. For a representative example, see PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
§ 9.6.1.2, at 828-30 (2d ed. 1999). For a more sympathetic assessment of Judge Greene’s performance, see Joseph
D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulation Under Judge Greene, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1459-71 (1999).
10. For overviews of the 1996 Act, see Jonathan E. Canis & Enrico C. Soriano, The Telecommunications Act of
1996: A Global Analysis, 4 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 147 (1996); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123 (1996); Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A
Guide to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251 (1997).
11. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. 2784 (1999) (Sen. Trent Lott) (calling the telephone provisions the “centerpiece”
of the 1996 Act); Christopher S. Yoo, Modularity Theory and Internet Regulation, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 40
(same); James B. Speta, Antitrust and Local Competition Under the Telecommunications Act, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 99,
99 (2003) (same).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2).
13. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 124 (repealing 47 U.S.C.
§ 533(b)). Congressman Rick Boucher has traced this provision to a bill he co-sponsored with then-Senator Al Gore,
which he said planted “the first seeds of the Act.” Reflecting on Twenty Years Under the Telecommunications Act of
1996: A Collection of Essays on Implementation, 68 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 4 (2016) [hereinafter Reflecting on Twenty
Years] (Rep. Rick Boucher). This provision simply codified a string of lower court decisions holding that the ban
violated the First Amendment on which the Supreme Court had already heard oral argument when the 1996 Act was
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preempted all state laws limiting competition in local and long distance telephone service 14 and
overturned the Supreme Court’s decision in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co.15 by
giving the FCC the flexibility to forbear from applying any unnecessary regulations. 16
In return, LECs were subject to measures designed to open their markets to competition.
Specifically, the Act imposed a regime of resale, number portability, dialing parity, and
reciprocal compensation on all LECs.17 LECs providing service the day the 1996 Act was signed
(called incumbent LECs (ILECs)) bore the additional obligations to interconnect and provide
unbundled access to their network elements. 18 The Act also codified for the first time the FCC’s
longstanding “universal service” policy of promoting the extension of communications services
to as many Americans as possible, expanding affordable nationwide telephone service to schools,
health care providers, and libraires and specifying that it be funded by contributions from
telecommunications carriers providing long distance telephone services. 19 At the same time, the
Act codified the FCC’s so-called Customer Proprietary Network Information privacy rules that
the FCC developed during its Computer Inquiries to protect competition in local
telecommunications, extending them to protect user privacy by expanding them to apply to small

passed. Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 697, 754-57 (2010); Christopher S. Yoo, The First Amendment, Common Carriers, and Public
Accommodations: Net Neutrality, Digital Platforms, and Privacy, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 513, 543-44 (2021). The Act
permits telephone companies to offer cable service as an unregulated radio-based service, a common carrier, a cable
operator, or a new hybrid category known as open video systems that never amounted to anything significant. 47
U.S.C. § 571(a).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 253.
15. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 160.
17. Id. § 251(b).
18. Id. § 251(c).
19. Id. § 254(b)(6) & (d).
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as well as large carriers.20 It also required all LECs and other investor-owned utilities to provide
others with access to their poles, ducts, conduits, and rights of way. 21
B.

CABLE

The deal was more complex for the cable industry, coming on the heels of a broad
deregulation in 1984 followed by the re-imposition of regulation in 1992 22 and with key parts of
the deal emerging late in the legislative process. 23 The primary benefit to the cable industry was
the enactment of a framework to deregulate the rates charged to consumers. 24 The Act also
prohibited state and local governments from limiting cable operators’ ability to provide
telephone service.25 The Act further allowed cable operators to own broadcast networks and
increased their ability to own broadcast stations.26
As noted earlier, one of the tradeoffs for these benefits was opening the local cable
market to competition from local telephone companies.27 Cable was also subject to greater
restrictions on indecent programming, including larger fines for transmitting obscene
programming;28 the obligation to scramble sexually explicit programming and to scramble or
block programming upon subscriber request; 29 and the authority not to carry obscenity,

20. Id. § 222.
21. Id. §§ 224, 251(b)(4). The prior statute enacted in 1978 did not require utilities to permit pole attachments,
but it did regulate the rates for utilities that chose to permit them could charge for them. Pole Attachments Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, 92 Stat. 35 (1978).
22. Christopher S. Yoo, An Unsung Success Story: A Forty-Year Retrospective on U.S. Communications
Policy, 41 TELECOM. POL’Y 891, 898 (2017).
23. Reflecting on Twenty Years, supra note 13, at 52 (Sen. Larry Pressler).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 543.
25. Id. § 541(b)(3). The franchising authority may also not include telecommunications revenue to calculate the
cable franchise fee. Id. § 542(b).
26. Sec. 202(f)(1), 110 Stat. at 111 (revising 47 C.F.R. § 76.501).
27. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
28. 47 U.S.C. § 559.
29. Id. §§ 560-561.
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indecency, or nudity on public or leased access channels. 30 The Act also required cable operators
to open their networks to set-top boxes provided by third parties 31 and to provide closed
captioning of public service announcements. 32
C.

BROADCASTING

The broadcasting industry was a major beneficiary of the 1996 Act, particularly after
then-Minority Leader Robert Dole put a hold on the version of the legislation passed by the
House in 1994 on the correct expectation that both houses of Congress would flip to Republican
control.33 The most dramatic change was the liberalization of ownership restrictions for radio and
television stations.34 Regarding the digital television transition, the Act added a new provision
requiring that “[i]f the Commission determines to issue additional licenses” for digital television,
it “should limit the initial eligibility for such licenses” to incumbent broadcasters. 35 The Act
lengthened the licensing term to eight years and revised the renewal process in ways that
increased the likelihood incumbent licensees would be renewed. 36 It also removed the restriction
barring broadcast stations from affiliating with more than one network. 37
The biggest burden taken on by the broadcast industry in return for these benefits is the
obligation that all television sets with screens of thirteen inches or larger be equipped with a Vchip that permits viewers to block programming based on its rating. 38 The Act further called for
the creation of an FCC advisory committee to establish a rating system one year following

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. § 532(c)(2).
Id. § 549.
Id. § 613.
Reflecting on Twenty Years, supra note 9, at 70 (Gerard J. Waldron).
Sec. 202(a)-(d), 110 Stat. at 110-11 (revising 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555).
47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1).
Id. §§ 307(c), 309(k).
Sec. 202(e), 110 Stat at 111 (revising 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g)).
47 U.S.C. § 303(x).
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enactment unless the industry voluntarily created one on its own. 39 Broadcasters must also
transmit the rating of any video content that has received a rating. 40
D.

INTERNET

For the most part, the 1996 Act almost entirely ignored the Internet. 41 The sole exception
is pornography, which Congress addressed by adopting the CDA criminalizing the use of an
interactive consumer service to share content that depicts sexual or excretory activities to
minors.42 These provisions grew out of legislation that Senator James Exon had submitted the
previous year and had undergone extensive consideration, including opposition by the Justice
Department, an adverse proposed amendment by Senator Patrick Leahy, and a frigid response
from House Speaker Newt Gingrich.43 CDA opponents backed a floor amendment by
Representatives Cox and Wyden providing immunity to interactive computer service providers,
with both provisions ending up in the final legislation. 44

39. Id. § 303 note.
40. Id. § 303(w)(2).
41. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2005) (observing that
Congress “largely failed to take the Internet into consideration when enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
. . .”); accord Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 857 (1997) (“The major components of the [Telecommunications Act
of 1996] have nothing to do with the Internet.”).
42. In the words of John Podesta, who served as Counselor to Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle when the
1996 Act was passed and who to serve as White House Chief of Staff during President Clinton’s second term, “with
the rather major exception of censorship, Congress simply legislated as if the Net were not there.” John D. Podesta,
Unplanned Obsolescence: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 Meets the Internet, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093, 1109
(1996).
43. Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating
Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 64-67 (1996).
44. Id. at 67-72, 91-92.
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E.

THE IMPACT OF THE 1996 ACT

Looking back at the 1996 Act from the vantage point of twenty-five years of history,
what is perhaps most striking is the number of major provisions that ended up not having any
enduring importance.45
Perhaps the most widely accepted premise is that the 1996 Act’s relaxation of the
ownership rules led to greater concentration that in turn has reduced media diversity. 46 Both
premises are more empirically complicated than generally believed. For example, Eli Noam’s
comprehensive study reported the levels of media concentration across various sectors from 1984
to 2005 in terms of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is now the measure of
concentration most widely accepted in policy circles, which he then combined into aggregate
measures.47 Noam found certain mass media sectors remained unconcentrated, 48 others went
from concentrated to moderately concentrated, 49 while still others had went from unconcentrated
to moderately concentrated.50 His weighted average of all twenty-seven mass media sectors
included in his study had increased from unconcentrated to the low end of moderately
concentrated levels from 1996 to 2005, with submeasures for content media industries and news
media remaining unconcentrated.51 In terms of the impact of concentration on diversity, reviews
of the literature find the empirical evidence to be mixed. 52 The Supreme Court’s recent decision

45. For a related argument, see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Ships Passing in the Night: The Communications Act
and the Convergence on Broadband,
46. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 856-57,
862-64, 868-72 (2002); Paul Wellstone, Growing Media Consolidation Must Be Examined to Preserve Our
Democracy, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 551 (2000).
47. ELI M. NOAM, MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND CONCENTRATION IN AMERICA (2009).
48. Id. at 299, 312-13 (TV/video distribution), 313 (combined TV/video programming and distribution) 314
(print).
49. Id. at 303-04 (electronic mass media programming distribution), 312-13 (TV/video programming).
50. Id. at 299 (mass media distribution), 314 (film), 317 (music).
51. Id. at 317-18.
52. Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 699 & nn.126-130,
700 & n.136 (2005) (reviewing the empirical literature and finding it inconclusive); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M.
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upholding the FCC’s 2017 order repealing its Newspaper/Broadcast and Radio/Television
Crossownership Rules and relaxing its Local Television Ownership Rule as no longer necessary
to promote competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity likely signals the denouement of the
debate over media ownership.53
Regarding telephony, long distance revenue withered even before voice over Internet
Protocol and online video conferencing providers, such as Free World Dialup, Vonage, and
Skype, rendered it largely worthless.54 The telephony provisions failed to induce competition in
local telephone service and have been abandoned. 55 Competition in local telephone service
emerged not through entry induced by the 1996 Act but rather through the advent of cellular
telephony (another technology almost entirely ignored by the 1996 Act). 56
Nor has the 1996 Act had much effect on the cable industry. For example, rate regulation
works only when a provider cannot maintain its profit margin simply by degrading product
quality.57 Somewhat ironically, empirical studies have shown that rate regulation actually caused
quality-adjusted rates to increase.58 Telephone companies have made small forays into providing
cable service but have yet to emerge as significant players. Instead, the primary competition has
come from direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers, such as DirecTV and the DISH Network, 59

Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media Consolidation: An Empirical Study, 61 STAN. L. REV. 781, 797-98 (2009)
(same); Joel Waldfogel, Should We Regulate Media Ownership?, in MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING
AND METRICS 3 (Philip M. Napoli ed., 2007) (same). Notably, Ho and Quinn’s study found that some mergers
reduced diversity, while others increased it. Ho & Quinn, supra, at 833-60.
53. FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021).
54. Yoo, supra note 22, at 893-94.
55. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone Networks,
61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 56-57 (2008) (describing how the FCC’s 2003 Triennial Review Order and 2005 Triennial
Review Remand Order ended unbundling for local telephone service).
56. Yoo, supra note 22, at 896.
57. Yoo, supra note 52, at 685-87.
58. THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION: THE
ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 69-177 (1997).; Gregory S. Crawford, The Impact of the 1992 Cable Act on
Household Demand and Welfare, 31 RAND J. ECON. 422, 444-45 (2000).
59. Yoo, supra note 22, at 898.
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and is now giving way to over-the-top providers, such as Netflix, Amazon Prime, Disney+, HBO
Max, Hulu, and Peacock.60 The set-top box initiative has continued to languish.61
The importance of the 1996 Act’s broadcasting provisions has similarly faded. After a
number of delays, the digital television transition has largely been completed, with full-power
analog stations going dark by summer 2009, 62 low-power analog stations outside of Alaska
returning their second channels by July 13, 2021, 63 and the transition eventually being completed
on January 10, 2022.64 The V-chip remains largely unused.65 The indecency restrictions proved
to be short lived. The Supreme Court struck down the CDA in 1997. 66 It invalidated the cable
indecency provisions three years later. 67

60. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1034, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (discussing how Internetbased video services are competing vigorously with traditional cable television).
61. On the failure of set-top boxes, see Tim Wu, Antitrust via Rulemaking: Competition Catalysts, 16 COLO
TECH. L.J. 33, 51-52 (2017). For economic critiques, see T. Randolph Beard et al., Wobbling Back to the Fire:
Economic Efficiency and the Creation of a Retail Market for Set-Top Boxes, 21 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1 (2012);
Ralitz A. Grigorova-Minchev & Thomas W. Hazlett, Policy-Induced Competition: The Case of Cable TV Set-Top
Boxes, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 279 (2011).
62. Most full-power analog television stations went dark on June 12, 2009. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, Full-Power TV Broadcasters Go All Digital (June 13, 2009), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/
DOC-291384A1.pdf. One hundred eighteen stations participating in the nightlight program were permitted to
operate until July 12, 2009. Public Notice, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Announces Revised Participant List for
Statutory Analog Nightly Program (June 11, 2009), 24 FCC Rcd. 7805 (2009).
63. Public Notice, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Media Bureau Reminds Low Power Television and Television
Translator Stations That the July 13, 2021, Digital Transition Date and Other Important Deadlines Are One Week
Away (July 6, 2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/ public/attachments/DA-21-786A1.pdf.
64. State of Alaska Request for Waiver of Section 74.731(m) of the Commission’s Rules – Low Power
Television Analog Termination Date, Order, FCC 21-78 (June 21, 2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/
FCC-21-78A1.pdf.
65. Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, Report, 22 FCC Rcd. 7929, 7942 ¶ 29 (2007)
(citing a 2004 study by the Kaiser Family Foundation, a 2003 study by the Annenberg Public Policy Center, and a
2007 Zogby poll).
66. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 857 (1997).
67. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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III.

POTENTIAL BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A NEW COMMUNICATIONS
STATUTE

Of the provisions considered major components of the 1996 Act, only universal service
has had lasting importance. Three others, including telecommunications privacy, intermediary
immunity under Section 230, and pole attachments, were not considered significant features of
the Act but have continued to have unexpected and more lasting significance. In addition, three
new issues have arisen that were not part of the 1996 Act. These include net neutrality, spectrum
policy, and antitrust reform. Together, these seven issues have the potential to serve as the
primary planks of a new communications statute.
A.

MAJOR PROVISION OF THE 1996 ACT THAT HAS CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE: UNIVERSAL
SERVICE
Unlike the other issues discussed in this Part, universal service was an important enough

component of the 1996 Act to merit a mention in President Clinton’s signing statement. 68 Since
that time, bipartisan support for extending Internet connectivity to more Americans has grown,
with FCC Chairmen from both parties consistently regarding closing the digital divide as a top
priority.69 This has led to a series of reforms to the FCC’s universal service programs. 70

68. Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 3, at 188.
69. See, e.g., William Kennard, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Address before the National Telephone
Cooperative Association Annual Meeting: A Networked Future for All Americans (Feb. 10, 1999), https://
transition.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/spwek907.html; Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding
Principles for the Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 17 (2004); Leslie Cauley, Martin wants
broadband across USA, ABC NEWS (Aug. 21, 2008, 5:54 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=
5614675 (quoting FCC Chairman Kevin Martin); Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,
Connecting America: A Plan to Reform and Modernize the supra and Intercarrier Compensation System (Oct. 6,
2011), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ attachments/DOC-310252A1.pdf; Oversight of the Federal Communications
Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 116th Cong. 1-2 (2016) (statement of Tom
Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n); Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 116th Cong. 1 (2020) (statement of Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed.
Commc’n Comm’n).
70. For the early post-1996 history of universal service reform, see Daniel J. Lyons, Narrowing the Digital
Divide: A Better Broadband Universal Service Program, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. 803, 817-26 (2019).
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Specifically, the Clinton Administration expanded the level of support and the geographic scope
of the low income programs in 1997.71 The George W. Bush Administration broadened universal
service to include wireless voice in 2008.72 The Obama Administration increased the level of
support while cracking down on fraud and abuse in 2012 73 and began in 2016 to phase out
support for voice in favor of broadband by December 2021. 74
The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this conversation, as remote work and school
became vital.75 The Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act
(CRRSAA), enacted during the Trump Administration as part of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2021, allocated an additional $3.2 billion for low income support. 76 The
Biden Administration implemented this mandate by subsidizing low income households up to
$50 per month and up to $100 for one time purchases of a computer or tablets, with tribal
households eligible to receive up to $75 per month. 77 This program was extended as part of the
Infrastructure Act, with the Affordable Connectivity Program providing low income households
with $30 per month toward broadband services. 78
For rural areas, the FCC created the High Cost Fund in 1997.79 The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act passed during the opening days of the Obama Administration allocated

71. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 8957, 8959-61, 8963 (1997).
72. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv. Tracfone Wireless, Inc., Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 6206, 6207, 6210,
6214-15 (2005).
73. Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 27 FCC Rcd. 6656, 6659 (2012).
74. Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization, Third Report and Order, Further Report and Order, and
Order on Reconsideration, 31 FCC Rcd. 3962, 3964 (2016).
75. Brandon Baker, The multilayered challenges of broadband expansion, PENN TODAY (June 18, 2021),
https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/multi-layered-challenges-broadband-expansion (noting that “the pandemic has
underscored the need for broadband in a way that is very popular”).
76. Pub. L. No. 116-260, sec. 904(i)(2), 134 Stat. 1182, 2135.
77. Emergency Broadband Benefit Program, Report and Order, 36 FCC Rcd. 4612, 4614 ¶ 4 (2021).
78. Affordable Connectivity Program, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/acp.
79. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. at 8784 ¶ 10.
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$7.2 billion toward new construction.80 The Obama Administration began redirecting rural
support away from funding fixed-line voice service toward funding mobile voice and broadband
service in 2011.81 It also shifted focus from high-cost to unserved areas and used reverse auctions
to allocate support.82 After ISPs declined $285 million of the $300 million offered during CAF
Phase I and the CAF Phase II auctions allocated only $1.5 billion out of the $20 billion available,
the Trump Administration replaced CAF with the new Rural Development Opportunity Fund
(RDOF),83 which in November 2020 successfully allocated $9.2 of the $16 billion in available
funds in its Phase I auction covering up to 5.2 million of the 5.3 million targeted homes. 84 The
forthcoming RDOF Phase II auction should offer up to $11.2 billion in additional universal
service funding.85
In addition to these ongoing programs, Congress has recently enacted a number of
measures to provide additional funding for closing the digital divide. The CRRSAA allocated an
additional $1.3 billion for rural broadband. 86 The Broadband Infrastructure Framework enacted
into law with bipartisan support includes $65 billion for broadband deployment. 87 These
contributions provide meaningful assistance, but they do not eliminate the need for ongoing
support for annual operating costs in many areas.

80. Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 6001(g), 123 Stat. 115, 514.
81. Connect Am. Fund, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663,
17671 ¶ 20 (2011), petitions for review denied sub nom. In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2014).
82. Id. at 17723 ¶ 150, 17780-83 ¶¶ 321-329.
83. Rural Digital Opportunity Fund Connect America Fund, Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 686, 688, ¶ 4
(2020).
84. Compare Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Releases Final List of Areas Eligible for Rural
Digital Opportunity Fund Phase I Auction (Oct. 8, 2020), https:// docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC367419A1.pdf (5.3 million homes targeted), with Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Successful Rural Digital
Opportunity Fund Auction to Expand Broadband to Over 10 Million Rural Americans (Dec. 7, 2020), https://
docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-368588A1.pdf (5.2 million homes covered).
85. RDOF/Broadband Federal Funding, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
broadbandfederalfunding/ (last visited January 10, 2022).
86. Sec. 905(b), 134 Stat. at 2138.
87. Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, § 60102,135 Stat. 429, 1182-1205.
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Universal service reform thus already has significant momentum that may lead to
additional funding in the next communications statute, and the influx of funding from the
Broadband Infrastructure Framework came with a Congressional directive for the FCC to
explore the future of USF funding. 88 That said, the funding mechanism for ongoing support
represents a significant challenge. The statute provides that “[e]very telecommunications carrier
that provides interstate telecommunications services” shall contribute, a classification that
exempts “information service providers” from having to provide funding. 89 Taxes that artificially
raise the price of incremental activity that is not completely inelastic necessarily create wellknown economic inefficiencies.90
Moreover, technological change has destabilized this funding mechanism. 91 Due to the
steep decline in long distance telephone revenues over the years, the contribution rate has
increased steadily, rising from 5.7% in the second quarter of 2000 92 to a peak of 31.8% in the
third quarter of 202193 before receding to 25.2% in the first quarter of 2022. 94
At a high level, there are two proposed solutions: expand the contribution base to include
the big tech firms sending content through the network or fund the program through
congressional appropriations. The former approach is supported by FCC Commissioner Brendan

88. Nadia Dreid, FCC to Probe Future of Universal Service Funding, LAW360 (Dec. 17, 2021), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1449534/fcc-to-probe-future-of-universal-service-funding.
89. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
90. Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Economic Welfare and Telecommunications Regulation: The E-Rate
Policy for Universal-Service Subsidies, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 19, 33-36 (1999); Krattenmaker, supra note 10, at 16566; Jerry Ellig, Intercarrier Compensation and Consumer Welfare, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 97, 106-12
(2005).
91. Lyons, supra note 70, at 839-42.
92. Public Notice, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Proposed Second Quarter 2000 Universal Service Contribution
Factor (Mar. 7, 2000), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-00-517A1.pdf.
93. Public Notice, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Proposed Third Quarter 2021 Universal Service Contribution
Factor (June 10, 2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-21-676A1.pdf.
94. Public Notice, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Proposed First Quarter 2022 Universal Service Contribution
Factor (Dec. 13, 2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-21-1550A1.pdf.
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Carr,95 the Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee’s model state code, 96 and Senators
Wicker, Capito, and Young, who introduced the Funding Affordable Internet with Reliable
(FAIR) Contributions Act.97 The latter has drawn the support of then-FCC Chairman Ajit Pai. 98
The next communications statute may have to address how to make universal service funding
mechanisms more sustainable.
B.

MINOR PROVISIONS OF THE 1996 ACT THAT HAVE BECOME MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN
EXPECTED
In contrast to universal service, which was always considered an important (although far

from the most important) part of the 1996 Act, other provisions that were regarded as minor at
the time have turned out to loom larger in current communications policy than expected. These
include privacy, intermediary immunity under Section 230, and pole attachments.
1.

Privacy

In general, U.S. law relies primarily on sector-specific privacy regulation, with primary
responsibility for protecting general privacy concerns resting with the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) under its authority to curb deceptive trade practices to ensure actors honor

95. Joan Engebretson, FCC Commissioner Wants Big Tech to Contribute to USF, Help Fund Universal
Broadband, TELECOMPETITOR (May 25, 2021), https://www.telecompetitor.com/fcc-commissioner-wants-big-techto-contribute-to-usf-help-fund-universal-broadband/.
96. Broadband Deployment Advisory Comm., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, State Model Code for Accelerating
Broadband Infrastructure Deployment and Investment 30 (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/
bdac-12-0607-2018-model-code-states-final-approved-sections.pdf [hereinafter BDAC State Model Code].
97. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., Wicker, Capito, Young Introduce Bill to
Explore Collecting USF Contributions from Big Tech (July 21, 2021), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2021/7/
wicker-capito-young-introduce-bill-to-explore-collecting-usf-contributions-from-big-tech.
98. Remarks of FCC Chairman Ajit Pai to the Multicultural Media, Telecom & Internet Council and the
National Grange (Jan. 12, 2021) (calling on Congress to set aside $50 billion from the C-Band auction to fund the
Universal Service Program for the next five years), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC369186A1.pdf.
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the representations made in their privacy policies. 99 The FTC’s jurisdiction does not apply to
common carriers.100 This exception took on a new importance when the Obama Administration
reclassified broadband Internet access service as a telecommunications service, which divested
the FTC of jurisdiction.101 The FCC issued new rules reinterpreting the privacy provisions of the
1996 Act to protect all personally identifiable information. 102 Five months later, Congress
invoked the Congressional Review Act to invalidate the FCC’s new privacy rules.. 103
The more influential development has been the wave of state privacy legislation triggered
by the referendum-induced enactment of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). 104 Other
states have similarly adopted general privacy regulation, 105 while still others have enacted
legislation targeting ISPs.106 The proliferation of state privacy laws have led a wide range of
companies, many of which had been skeptical of federal privacy legislation, to become more
supportive of the idea.107 Interest in a federal solution might provide another aspect incorporated
into the next round of major legislative reform.

99. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
100. Id. § 45(a)(2).
101. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order,
30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5724-25 ¶¶ 283-284 (2015).
102. Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services, Report and
Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 13911 (2016).
103. Act of Apr. 3, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-22, 131 Stat. 88.
104. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-.199.100. The California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) amended the CCPA by
referendum in November 2020. Cal. Proposition 24 (2020), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/190021A1%20%28Consumer%20 Privacy%20-%20Version%203%29_1.pdf.
105. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1301 to -1313 (enacted July 8, 2021); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-575 to -.585
(enacted Mar. 2, 2021). Other general state privacy statutes preceded the CCPA. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§§ 1201C-1206C (enacted in 2015).
106. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 35-A § 9301 (enacted June 6, 2019). Other state privacy statutes treating
ISPs differently preceded the CCPA. See MINN. STAT. §§ 325m.01-.09 (enacted in 2002); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 205.498 (enacted in 1999).
107. Will Oremus, Beware of Tech Companies Bearing Privacy Laws, SLATE (Aug. 28, 2018, 5:50 AM), https://
slate.com/technology/2018/08/facebook-and-googles-plan-for-a-new-federal-privacy-law-is-really-about-protectingthemselves.html.
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2.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act

Although Congress had debated most of the major provisions of the 1996 Act for years,
some provisions received considerably less consideration. For example, although Senator James
Exon initially introduced the CDA as standalone legislation designed to curb indecency on the
Supreme,108 the Senate added it to the 1996 Act by a vote of 84-16, 109 with many of its
provisions never having been subjected to hearings or committee deliberation. 110 The provision
that would eventually be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 received even less consideration, having
been added to the bill on the House floor by a vote of 420 to 4. 111 Although Section 230 was
conceived as an alternative to the CDA, the final legislation included both. 112 The Supreme
Court’s invalidation of the provisions originating in Senator Exon’s proposal meant that Section
230 emerged as the relevant provision.113
Section 230 reflected an approach that was quite different from that taken by the CDA.
Rather than regulate online indecency directly, Section 230 changed private actors’ incentives to
engage in self regulation by enacting “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening
of offensive material.”114 It did so by specifying that providers that host content not be
considered as publishers and not be liable for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, flighty, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” 115

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
in part).
113.
114.
115.

S. 314, 104th Cong. (1995).
141 CONG. REC. 16026 (1995).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997).
141 CONG. REC. 22054 (1995).
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 79 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
Id.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
Id. § 230(c)(1), (2)(A).
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During its early years, Section 230 was lauded as “the twenty-six words that created the
internet” due to its role in fostering growth of web platforms by protecting edge providers from
liability for third party content116 The 2018 enactment of statute variously named the Stop
Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA) and the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA)
withdrew immunity for interactive computer service providers that promote or facilitate
prostitution.117
More recently, Section 230 has become as one of the most controversial aspects of the
1996 Act. While some advocates continue to defend the importance of Section 230 in fostering a
free internet,118 the statute has faced growing criticism from both sides of the aisle. Both
Presidents Trump and Biden have called for its repeal or amendment. 119 Calls for reform of
Section 230 have come from the bench as well. Justice Thomas has encouraged the court to
consider “[p]aring back the sweeping immunity courts have read into § 230” when a more
appropriate case comes before the court.120 Dozens of bills to revise or repeal Section 230 have
been introduced in Congress since 2020. 121
Bipartisan support for reforming Section 230 creates some possibility that it might form
part of the next communications statute. The stark differences in the reasons the two parties

116. JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019).
117. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat.
1253 (2018).
118. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Dear President Biden: You Should Save, Not Revoke, Section 230, BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS (Jan. 12, 2021), https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-01/dear-president-biden-you-should-save-notrevoke-section-230/.
119. Rachel Lerman, Social media liability law is likely to be reviewed under Biden, WASH. POST (Jan. 18,
2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/18/biden-section-230/.
120. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 18 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).
121. See, e.g., Kiran Jeevanjee et al., All the Ways Congress Wants to Change Section 230, SLATE (Mar. 23,
2021), https://slate.com/technology/2021/03/section-230-reform-legislative-tracker.html; Cristiano Lima, Congress
is weighing changes to Section 230, again. Here are what bills stand a chance, WASH. POST. (Nov. 29, 2021, 9:13
AM EST), https:// www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/2021/11/29/congress-is-weighing-changes-section-230-againheres-what-bills-stand-chance/.
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support such reform may leave little room for agreement, however. 122 Republicans generally
believe that online platforms exercise too much editorial discretion. 123 Democrats are concerned
that they exercise too little.124
3.

Pole Attachments

Another feature of the 1996 Act that was regarded as minor when it was enacted was the
amendment of the Pole Attachment Act of 1978 requiring that utilities provide cable television
systems and telecommunications providers with nondiscriminatory access to their poles, ducts,
conduits and rights of way.125 Although the requirement that utilities give cable television
systems and telecommunications carriers nondiscriminatory access to their poles was not
regarded as a significant provision of the 1996 Act, 126 the deployment of new network
technologies has heightened its importance. For example, the ongoing deployment of the newest
generation of mobile broadband technology known as 5G employs base stations that serve areas

122. Todd Shields & Ben Brody, Washington’s Knives Are Out for Big Tech’s Social Media Shield,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-11/ section-230-is-hated-by-bothdemocrats-and-republicans-for-different-reasons.
123. See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,080-81 (May 28, 2020) (noting that “Section 230 was
not intended to allow a handful of companies to grow into titans controlling vital avenues for our national discourse
under the guise of promoting open forums for debate, and then to provide those behemoths blanket immunity when
they use their power to censor content and silence viewpoints that they dislike” and calling for the FCC to initiate a
rulemaking to revise the interpretation of Section 230); Memorandum from the Energy and Com. Comm.
Republican Staff to Stakeholders and Interested Parties, Big Tech Accountability Platform (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2021.04.15-Big-Tech-Memo-StaffLegislative-Concepts.pdf.
124. See Shannon Bond, Democrats Want to Hold Social Media Companies Responsible for Health
Misinformation, NPR (Jul. 22, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/22/1019346177/ democrats-want-to-hold-socialmedia-companies-responsible-for-health-misinformat (discussing proposed reforms to Section 230 supported by
Democrats that would strip immunity from firms promoting health misinformation during a health crisis); Makena
Kelly, Democrats take first stab at reforming Section 230 after Capitol riots, VERGE (Feb. 5, 2021), https://
www.theverge.com/2021/2/5/22268368/democrats-section-230-moderation-warner-klobuchar-facebook-google
(discussing proposed reforms to Section 230 supported by Democrats that would require platforms to introduce
additional moderation).
125. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1).
126. For example, President Clinton’s signing statement did not mention the pole attachment provisions.
Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 1.
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that are much smaller than those served by previous technologies (often known as small cells). 127
The need to locate base stations in more locations is leading 5G providers to invoke the Pole
Attachment Act for the right to place them on utility poles. 128
The 1996 Act gives the FCC the authority to regulate pole attachment rates, although this
authority does not apply to poles owned by cities or cooperatives or those that are subject to state
regulation.129 In 2018, the FCC invoked the authority granted by the 1996 Act to preempt state
and local laws that constitute barriers to entry to new entities providing broadband service 130 to
(1) establish time limits for deciding permit requests, (2) limit fees for small cell attachments to
reasonable approximations of objective costs, (3) invalidate state and local moratoria on
telecommunications services and facilities deployment, and (4) implement a federal “one touch
make-ready” process that replaced state and local laws, all of which were largely upheld on
judicial review.131 The need to facilitate the deployment of 5G and other new technologies
through the use of small cells on pole attachments may create demand for a new communications
statute that changes the formula for determining the reasonableness of pole attachment rates or
broadens the access obligation to apply to facilities owned by municipalities and cooperatives.

127. Christopher S. Yoo & Jesse Lambert, 5G and Net Neutrality, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET –
INNOVATION, INTEGRATION AND SUSTAINABILITY 221, 225 (Guenter Knieps & Volcker Stocker eds., 2019).
128. Accelerating Wireless Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, Report
and Order, 32 FCC Rcd. 9760, 9765 (2017).
129. 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(1) & (3), (b)-(c).
130. Id. §§ 253, 332(c)(7)(B)(i).
131. Accelerating Wireless Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment,
Declaratory Ruling and Third Report and Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 9088 (2018), denying the petitions for review in part
and granting petitions for review in part sub nom. City of Portland v. United States, 969 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2020).
“One touch make-ready” is a process “that allows new attachers themselves to do all the preparations” necessary to
attach new equipment to existing utility poles. Portland, 969 F.3d at 1050.
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C.

ISSUES THAT ARE CURRENTLY SIGNIFICANT THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE 1996 ACT
Given the technological and economic dynamism of the modern communications

environment, the fact that certain provisions of the 1996 Act ended being more and less
important than expected is unsurprising. Equally predictable is that new issues have arisen since
1996 that the 1996 Act failed to anticipate. These include three that could form the basis for a
new political deal that could support the next great communications statute: net neutrality,
spectrum policy, and antirust reform.
1.

Net Neutrality

The debate over net neutrality has dominated communications policy for nearly the past
two decades.132 The Obama Administration enacted rules prohibiting last-mile Internet service
providers, such as AT&T and Comcast, from engaging in unreasonable discrimination against
certain types of traffic, only to see those rules revoked during the Trump Administration. 133
President Biden’s Executive Order calling on the FCC to revive net neutrality regulation
guarantees that this issue will remain a central issue. 134
One of the central issues in the debate over net neutrality, which requires ISPs to treat all
internet traffic equally, turns on the narrow question whether services offered by last-mile
broadband ISPs, such as AT&T or Comcast, constitute information services or
telecommunications services. The D.C. Circuit has held that the FCC cannot mandate

132. For the article generally credited with coining the phrase, net neutrality, see Tim Wu. Net Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). For a response and reply published in
the same journal the next year, see Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Network Neutrality Help or Hurt
Broadband Competition?: A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004);
and Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2004).
133. For a brief history of net neutrality regulation, see Mozilla v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
134. Exec. Order No. 14,036, § 5(l)(i), 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,994 (July 9, 2021).
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nondiscrimination if they are classified as the former135 but may do so if classified as the
latter.136 Supreme Court precedent dictates that the statute is ambiguous as to the proper statutory
classification of last-mile broadband Internet access service and that the FCC’s determination
will receive Chevron deference.137
The FCC has reclassified last-mile broadband Internet access service the last three times
the White House has changed parties, and each time that action was upheld by the courts. 138
Consistent with the recent change in power, President Biden’s Executive Order on Promoting
Competition in the American Economy endorsed reclassifying last-mile broadband Internet
access service yet again.139 Moreover, seven states have responded to the most recent
reclassification by enacting statutes regulating net neutrality, with nine additional states
introducing similar legislation during their 2021 sessions. 140 Courts have thus far split on
whether federal law preempts state attempts to regulate net neutrality. 141 The desire to stop net
neutrality from oscillating back and forth every time the White House switches parties and to
clarify the role of state legislation may provide some support for including net neutrality as part
of the next communications statute.

135. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 650, 655-57 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
136. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 697-711 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
137. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 969 (2005).
138. See id. at 1003 (upholding the George W. Bush Administration’s decision to classify last-mile broadband
access as an information service); USTA, 825 F.3d at 744 (upholding the Obama Administration’s decision to
reclassify last-mile broadband access as a telecommunications service); Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 86 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (upholding the Trump Administration’s decision to reclassify last-mile broadband access as an
information service).
139. Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,994 (July 9, 2021).
140. See Casey Lide, State Net Neutrality Laws May Lead to Federal Legislation, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 1, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/state-net-neutrality-laws-may-lead-to-federal-legislation.
141. Compare N.Y. State Telecomm. Ass’n v. James, 544 F. Supp. 3d 269, 279-88 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (holding
the FCC’s decision not to regulate broadband preempted state law), with ACA Connects – Am.’s Commc’ns Ass’n
v. Becerra, 24 F.4th 1233 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding the opposite).
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2.

Spectrum Policy

The politics around the 1996 Act focused almost entirely on the digital television
transition. As noted earlier, the Act required that should the FCC decide to issue digital
television licenses, they could go only to incumbent broadcasters. 142 Even before the Act was
passed, a bipartisan group of senators led by Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole criticized this
provision as corporate welfare and required the FCC to agree not to issue any digital television
licenses until Congress had taken further action.143 In addition, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 had mandated the use of auctions to allocate spectrum licenses
starting on July 1, 1997.144
Faced with the prospect of having to pay for spectrum, television broadcasters began
“tripping all over themselves to give up their First Amendment rights,” to use the words of one
FCC official.145 After resisting the idea of ratings for years, the industry quickly capitulated and
agreed to create its own rating system.146 Shortly after Dole left the Senate to campaign for the
presidency full time on June 11, 1996, Congress notified the FCC that it had abolished the Dole
agreement.147 Two months later, the FCC and the industry reached an agreement to impose
quantitative requirements for children’s educational programming. 148 The major broadcast
networks began making putatively voluntary commitments to more free air time for federal

142. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
143. Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91
GEO. L.J. 245, 352-53 (2003) [hereinafter Yoo, Rise and Demise]; Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment
to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1700 (2003) [hereinafter Yoo, Rethinking Free, Local Television].
144. Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002, § 309(j), 107 Stat. 312, 388-92.
145. Quoted in Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 905, 942 (1997).
146. 47 U.S.C. § 303 note.
147. Hazlett, supra note 145, at 940; Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note 143, at 353; Yoo, Rethinking Free,
Local Television, supra note 143, at 1700.
148. Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 10660,
10718-23 ¶¶ 120-29 (1996).
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political candidates.149 In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress explicitly forbade the FCC
from auctioning digital television licenses.150 The net result was to double the amount given to
the only industry receiving spectrum for free without increasing the industry’s competitiveness
or diversity.151
As noted earlier, the completion of the digital television transition and the decline of the
broadcast television industry has turned this story into more of a parable than an analysis of a
live policy issue.152 The more important current challenge is the demand for wireless broadband,
which has grown precipitously in recent years. The shift is demonstrated eloquently by the recent
incentive auction, in which many television broadcasters received payments in return for
allowing their spectrum to be redeployed for wireless broadband. 153 Auctions also provide
incremental revenue that can allow Congress to avoid the supermajority approval for all
measures that are not budget neutral. 154 The FCC has successfully allocated several new
spectrum bands to wireless broadband, 155 but continuing growth may require further legislative
attention.

149. Hazlett, supra note 145, at 942.
150. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(2); see also Yoo, Rethinking Free, Local Television, supra note 143, at 1700.
151. Krattenmaker, supra note 10, at 163-64.
152. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
153. Thomas W. Hazlett, FCC “Incentive Auction” marks progress and pitfalls towards freeing wireless
spectrum, BROOKINGS INST. (May 24, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ techtank/2017/05/24/fcc-incentiveauction-marks-progress-and-pitfalls-towards-freeing-wireless-spectrum/.
154. CONG. BUDGET OFF., BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE BALANCED BUDGET ACT OF 1997, at 11-15
(1997), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/bba-97.pdf.
155. See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Announces Winning Bidders of 3.5 GHz Band Auction
(Sept. 2, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-366624A1.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, FCC Opens 100 Megahertz of Mid-Band Spectrum for 5G (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.fcc.gov/
document/fcc-opens-100-megahertz-mid-band-spectrum-5g; Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts
New Rules for the 6 GHz Band, Unleashing 1,200 Megahertz of Spectrum for Unlicensed Use (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-363945A1.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Grants
C-Band Spectrum Licenses (July 23, 2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-374358A1.pdf.
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3.

Antitrust Reform

Perhaps the most dramatic change in the political attitudes over technology over the past
decade is with respect to digital platforms. At the time the 1996 Act was passed, these companies
were flying below the radar. Amazon was a mere two years old, a year from going public, and
sold only books.156 Google was two years on the horizon,157 and Facebook was eight.158 Apple
was in the midst of a severe slump, in the process of firing its CEO, and a year away from
bringing back Steve Jobs.159 The only established tech firm was Microsoft, which was
confronted with a series of major antitrust suits.160 The most significant player was America
Online, whose merger with Time Warner would soon make it the target of antitrust scrutiny. 161
The world looks quite different today. According to The Financial Times, Apple,
Microsoft, Alphabet (Google), Amazon, and Meta (Facebook) represented five of the seven
largest firms in the world by market capitalization as of December 2021. 162 The federal
government has brought antitrust cases against Google and Facebook and is investigating cases
against Amazon and Apple.163 During both the 2020 campaigns, both candidates endorsed

156. Amazon.com, Inc. History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/ companyhistories/amazon-com-inc-history/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2021).
157. Google, Inc. History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/ company-histories/googleinc-history/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2021).
158. Christopher McFadden, A Brief History of Facebook, Its Major Milestones, INTERESTING ENGINEERING
(July 7, 2020), https://interestingengineering.com/history-of-facebook.
159. OWEN W. LINZMAYER, APPLE CONFIDENTIAL 2.0: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST
COLORFUL COMPANY 151, 198-202, 289 (2004).
160. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d
935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
161. America Online, Inc., 131 F.T.C. 829 (2001).
162. Matthew Johnston, Biggest Companies in the World by Market Cap, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 21, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/biggest-companies-in-the-world-by-market-cap-5212784.
163. Factbox: How Big Tech is faring against U.S. lawsuits and probes, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2021, 6:11 PM
EDT), https://www.reuters.com/technology/big-tech-wins-two-battles-fight-with-us-antitrust-enforcers-2021-06-29/.
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vigorous antitrust enforcement against big tech companies. 164 President Biden has issued an
executive order encouraging the fair and vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws and calling
on the FTC Chair to consider enacting rules to prevent “unfair data collection and surveillance
practices” and “unfair competition in major Internet marketplaces.” 165 He also appointed one of
the leading advocates for more stringent antitrust scrutiny of big tech firms as head of the
FTC.166
Interest in antitrust enforcement against big tech has also been a hot topic on Capitol Hill.
The House Judiciary Committee has conducted a July 2020 hearing at which the CEOs of
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google testified 167 as part of a sixteen-month investigation that
produced a 449-page staff report. 168 During the summer of 2021, the House Judiciary Committee
passed six bills on antitrust, with provisions on updating merger filing fees, amending the venues
for antitrust suits brought by state attorney generals, limiting the ability of technology companies
to buy nascent competitors, lowering switching costs between platforms, prohibiting companies
from preferencing their own products over those of competitors, and authorizing breaking up
technology companies when necessary to eliminate conflicts of interest. 169 On the other side of

164. Jon Swartz, Here’s where Biden and Trump stand on antitrust, social media and other tech issues,
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 1, 2020, 5:21 PM ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-where-biden-and-trumpstand-on-antitrust-social-media-and-other-tech-issues-2020-10-01 (2020 campaign).
165. Exec. Order No. 14,036, § 5(b), (h)(i) & (iv), 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,991-92 (July 14, 2021).
166. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Lina M. Khan Sworn in as Chair of the FTC (June 15, 2021), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/06/lina-m-khan-sworn-chair-ftc.
167. Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 6: Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and
Google: Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong (2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
CHRG-116hhrg41317/html/CHRG-116hhrg41317.htm.
168. SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL AND ADMIN. L., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2020),
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ competition_in_digital_markets.pdf [hereinafter C ICILLINE REPORT].
169. Sharis A. Pozen, House Judiciary Passes Six Antitrust Bills Targeting Tech Platforms and Large
Transactions, Setting Up Vote Before House of Representatives, CLIFFORD CHANCE (June 28, 2021), https://
www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2021/06/ House-Judiciary-Committee-Passes-SixAntitrust-Bills-Targeting-Tech-Platforms-and-Large-Transactions.pdf.
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the Capitol, Senators Klobuchar and Grassley have introduced antitrust reform legislation that
would adopt positions similar to provisions included in the House bills. 170
House Judiciary Committee approval of these bills did not proceed down straight party
lines: Some Republicans voted in favor, and some Democrats voted against, 171 with lawmakers
from California emerging as key opponents to the legislation. 172 The Senate bill was cosponsored
by five Democrats and five Republicans. 173 Opponents have argued that these proposals would
hurt America’s ability to compete with China, a contention that supporters of the legislation have
disputed.174 The complex nature of the coalitions backing these proposals suggests some
possibility they could generate enough votes to support passage but only if they can attract
sufficient votes in the Senate to break cloture.
* * *
The constellation of interests thus appears to be quite different from the one undergirding
the enactment of the 1996 Act. These distinctions necessarily render impossible the recreation of
the political deal that led to the 1996 Act. At the same time, they open new potential bases for a
political bargain.

170. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Amy Klobuchar, Klobuchar, Grassley, Colleagues to Introduce Bipartisan
Legislation to Rein in Big Tech (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/10/
klobuchar-grassley-colleagues-to-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-rein-in-big-tech [hereinafter Klobuchar Press
Release].
171. Pozen, supra note 169, at 4.
172. Emily Birnbaum, California lawmakers back the “goose that lays the golden eggs” in antitrust fight,
POLITICO (Jun. 25, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/25/california-lawmakers-antitrust-496180
(explaining how “bipartisan lawmakers are coming out aggressively in defense of Silicon Valley, the ‘goose that
lays the golden eggs,’ in the words of Rep. Lou Correa (D), one of the members of the delegation.”).
173. Klobuchar Press Release, supra note 170.
174. See Zachary Basu & Margaret Harding McGill, Ex-intel officials claims antitrust could hurt U.S. in China
tech race, AXIOS (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.axios.com/china-antitrust-big-tech-national-security-d0fb2141-aefe407c-97ef-8da09cb54b55.html.
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IV.

POSSIBLE PATHS FOR GETTING TO YES

How might these various components coalesce into a political deal that offers sufficient
benefits to enough different segments of the industry to support enactment? The key players are
likely to play distinctly different roles. Television broadcasting, which has historically exerted
strong influence on legislation, is less likely to do so in the future. Although multichannel video
continues to serve as a key business of the cable industry, its focus is increasingly shifting to
broadband. Regarding telecommunications, voice has become a relatively minor application
riding on a broadband pipe, which has brought their interests more into alignment with the future
direction of the cable industry, and the technological emphasis has shifted from wired to wireless
transmission and from existing networks to the deployment of new technologies such as 5G. The
rapid ascent of Internet intermediaries, such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon, adds a new
dynamic to the legislative dealmaking. Finally, transactions such as the Comcast-NBC Universal
merger, the AT&T’s short-lived acquisition of Time Warner, and Verizon’s unsuccessful
purchases of Yahoo! and America Online have caused the sharp distinctions between these
categories to break down and have given particular companies multiple perspectives on the same
issue.
A.

AREAS WHERE STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS OVERLAP

Two areas exist where the interests of multiple sectors of the industry potentially overlap.
The first is universal service. The second is federal privacy legislation. The alignment of the
various sectors makes these issues likely candidates to be key components in any future
communications reform legislation.
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1.

Universal Service

Another area where the interests of different industry segments largely overlap is
universal service. Closing the digital divide would clearly benefit Internet intermediaries by
providing them with access to more customers. In fact, the leading players have long supported
initiatives to develop new technologies for expanding Internet connectivity, such as Facebook’s
Connectivity initiative;175 Google’s now defunct Loon and Station projects 176 and its much
curtailed fiber project;177 and initiatives to use low-earth orbit satellites to provide broadband,
such as Amazon’s Project Kuiper.178
Both telephone-based and cable-based ISPs are becoming more sanguine about universal
service as well. Many have supported low-income connectivity initiatives of their own, such as
Comcast Internet Essentials, Access from AT&T, and Charter’s Spectrum Internet Assist, among
others.179 Regarding rural support, the shift to reverse auctions and other reforms have made

175. Aljoscha Höhborn, Facebook Goes Boring. Yes!, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/06/28/technology/facebook-internet-access.html.
176. Both projects ran for several years but were recently terminated. Manish Singh, Alphabet shuts down Loon
internet balloon company, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 21, 2021, 7:42 PM EST), https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/21/googlealphabet-is-shutting-down-loon-internet/.
177. See David Anders, Whatever happened to Google Fiber?, C|NET (Mar. 5, 2021, 8:50 AM PT), https://
www.cnet.com/home/internet/google-fiber-explained/.
178. Harry Menear, Satellite showdown: OneWeb vs. Starlink vs. Project Kuiper, MOBILE MAG. (Mar. 26,
2021), https://mobile-magazine.com/wireless-networks/satellite-showdown-oneweb-vs-starlink-vs-project-kuiper.
179. Julie Zeglen, Comcast is doubling Internet Essentials speeds. The move comes amid ongoing digital equity
initiatives – and calls to do more, TECHNICAL.LY (Feb. 2, 2021, 4:12 PM), https:// technical.ly/2021/02/02/comcastinternet-essentials-digital-divide/; Connecting Communities to the American Dream, AT&T PUB. POL’Y (July 30,
2021, 12:43 PM), https:// www.attpublicpolicy.com/universal-service/connectingcommunities/.
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large ISPs increasingly open to accepting universal service funding. 180 Large ISPs have also
begun actively pursuing state grants issued under the Broadband Infrastructure Framework. 181
A key priority for ISPs is to make sure that these funds are targeted toward areas in which
no ISP is already providing service, as reflected in the universal service fund’s shift in focus
from high cost to unserved areas.182 This strikes me as good policy: The biggest social returns
will likely come from targeting the limited financial support that is available toward those who
are completely cut off from the Internet rather than those who have connectivity but only from a
single provider. Indeed, those who lack service entirely would no doubt regard wishing for better
connectivity as a distinctly high-class problem that they wish they had. Focusing subsidies on
areas where purely private service is uneconomical also eliminates any divergence of interest. If
anything, it alleviates political pressure on incumbents from having to make investments that are
uneconomical. Directing universal support toward unserved areas also avoids the unfairness of
asking a private company that has invested its own capital to compete with a provider that is
being subsidized by the government.

180. AT&T and Verizon declined to participate in the first round of CAF Phase I in 2012. Joan Engebretson,
Verizon, AT&T Decline Broadband Connect America Funding, TELECOMPETITOR (July 25, 2012), https://
www.telecompetitor.com/verizon-att-decline-connect-america-funding/. They began to show greater receptivity
during the second CAF Phase I round in 2013, in which AT&T accepted $100 million, but Verizon continued not
participating. Joan Engebretson, Verizon Again Declines CAF Funding But AT&T Accepts, TELECOMPETITOR (Aug.
20, 2013), https://www.telecompetitor.com/verizon-again-declines-caf-funding-but-att-accepts/. Large ISPs
participated slightly more actively in the 2015 CAF Phase II program, in which AT&T accepted $428 million in
funding and Verizon accepted $49 million for properties they were selling to Frontier. Nicole Blanchard, AT&T,
Frontier, others accept $1.5B in CAF-II funding despite FCC’s changing broadband definition, FIERCE TELECOM
(Dec. 2, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.fiercetelecom.com/special-report/at-t-frontier-others-accept-1-5b-caf-iifunding-despite-fcc-s-changing-broadband. Charter Communications was the biggest winner in the RDOF Phase I
reverse auction and is incorporating the $1.2 billion in universal service support into a $5 billion rural buildout
initiative. Charter Announces $5 Billion Initiative to Connect Unserved Americans, CHARTER PUB. POL’Y (Feb. 5,
2021), https://policy.charter.com/blog/charter-announces-5-billion-initiative-to-connect-unserved-americans.
181. See, e.g., Diana Goovaerts, Comcast, Verizon sang $44.9M to help deliver universal broadband in
Delaware, FIERCE TELECOM (Mar. 18, 2022, 11:33 AM), https://www.fiercetelecom.com/ broadband/comcastverizon-snag-449m-help-deliver-universal-broadband-delaware.
182. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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The one potential area of divergence is the source of universal service funding. As noted
earlier, universal service is currently funded by a tax base (interstate long distance) that is
currently dwindling more and more every year. 183 Clearly, suggestions to expand the current tax
to include big tech firms providing services through the network run counter to the interests of
Internet intermediaries.184 Although this could conceivably constitute a wedge issue between
Internet intermediaries and ISPs, the latter have chosen to support transitioning universal service
support to general appropriations.185 Not only is funding universal service through general
revenue better public policy186; it aligns the interests of the different sectors rather than driving a
wedge between them.
2.

Privacy

The data-driven nature of the big tech firms’ business models has long made privacy
regulation one of their primary concerns. Although big tech firms had been somewhat dubious
about the prospect of federal privacy legislation, the prospect of facing a patch work regime that
was the product of lobbying battles fought across all fifty states led them to become more
amenable.187 What is more interesting is the support that leading telephone-based and cable-

183. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
185. Mike Dano, Verizon, AT&T want to reshape Lifeline, LIGHT READING (Jan. 22, 2021), https://
www.lightreading.com/ossbss/verizon-atandt-want-to-reshape-lifeline-/a/d-id/766862 (explaining that AT&T and
Verizon consider the funding mechanism for Lifeline unsustainable, and both advocate for Congress to create a
direct appropriation so recipients can pay for their chosen broadband service). Some portions of the industry are
holding onto expanding the tax base as a backup option. Jonathan Spalter, Who Should Pay for Universal
Broadband Connectivity?, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.nexttv.com/ blogs/who-should-payfor-universal-broadband-connectivity.
186. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
187. See David McCabe & Cecilia Kang, As Congress Dithers, States Step in to Set Rules for the Internet, N.Y.
TIMES (May 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/technology/ state-privacy-internet-laws.html (noting
that Google, Amazon, and Facebook spent $5 million on state lobbying efforts in 2019, with Facebook’s Vice
President of State and Local Policy stating that “[w]hile we support state efforts to address specific challenges . . .
there are some issues, like privacy, where it’s time for updated federal rules for the internet — and those need to
come from Congress.”).
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based ISPs have lent to the effort,188 most likely to allow more diversified business models either
because of mergers with content companies or planned attempts to gain a share of online
advertising revenue.
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing these companies is the extent to which federal
privacy legislation would preempt state law. 189 Although industry members would prefer a
uniform federal standard, many members of Congress regard any federal legislation as a floor
above which states would remain free to enact additional restrictions. 190 A complicating factor is
the fact that some states have enacted privacy laws that apply only to ISPs, as noted above. 191
Needless to say, ISP-specific measures are of greater concern to ISPs than to edge providers. 192
B.

AREAS WHERE BIG TECH HAS MORE AT STAKE

Although the interests of various stakeholders align for federal privacy legislation and
universal service, they diverge for a number of other key issues. Specifically, there are some

188. Privacy, AT&T, https://about.att.com/csr/home/reporting/issue-brief/ privacy.html (last visited Aug. 26,
2021); Kathy Grillo, Privacy: It’s time for Congress to do right by consumers, VERIZON NEWS CTR. (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://www.verizon.com/about/news/ privacy-its-time-congress-do-right-consumers; Tom Rutledge, Charter Urges
Congress to Pass Legislation Protecting Privacy Everywhere on the Internet, CHARTER PUB. POL’Y (Apr. 8, 2018),
https://policy.charter.com/blog/charter-urges-congress-pass-legislation-protecting-privacy-everywhere-internet; see
also Letter from the Business Roundtable to Sen. Majority Leader Mitch McConnell et al. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://
s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/BRT-CEOLetteronPrivacy-2.pdf (letter from organization consisting of fifty-one
businesses from across the economy, including AT&T, Amazon, and Comcast, calling for federal privacy
legislation).
189. Scott Ikeda, Big Tech Moves to Influence State Privacy Laws, Laying the Groundwork for a Federal Push,
CPO MAG. (May 28, 2021), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-privacy/big-tech-moves-to-influence-state-privacylaws-laying-the-groundwork-for-a-federal-push/ (“conventional wisdom is that Silicon Valley would prefer federal
privacy laws that are favorable to them to a patchwork of state laws that vary in their terms.”); Anupam Chander et
al., Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1798 (2019).
190. Todd Feathers, Big Tech Is Pushing States to Pass Privacy Laws, and Yes, You Should Be Suspicious,
MARKUP (Apr. 15, 2021), https://themarkup.org/privacy/2021/04/15/big-tech-is-pushing-states-to-pass-privacylaws-and-yes-you-should-be-suspicious (explaining that experts believe big tech’s “ultimate goal is to prompt
federal legislation that would potentially override California’s privacy protections.”).
191. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
192. See ACA Connects – Am.’s Commc’ns Ass’n v. Frey, 471 F. Supp. 3d 318 (D. Me. 2020) (First
Amendment challenge by four ISP trade associations against Maine’s ISP-specific privacy law). In terms of full
disclosure, I am serving as an expert consultant in this litigation.
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issues that are more critical for big companies and other issues that loom larger for ISPs. In
particular, big tech companies have more at stake on two potential areas for future reform
legislation: Section 230 and antitrust. Note that the divergence of interest is not necessarily an
insuperable barrier to a new communications statute. It does frame more clearly the terms under
which the key subsectors of the industry might strike a mutually beneficial deal.
1.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act

Given the broad protections from liability that Section 230 currently provides to big tech
firms, these companies have the most to lose from the increasing calls from both Democrats and
Republicans to limit its scope or repeal it entirely, although some are making tactical concessions
to ensure that wholesale repeal of the statute is off the table. 193 At the same time, some ISPs have
come out in support of Section 230 reform, contrasting intermediaries’ freedom to moderate
content with both the liability imposed on traditional intermediaries and the nondiscrimination
mandates associated with net neutrality.194 Content providers have similarly pushed for Section
230 reform as a means to protect their intellectual property, joined by other noncommunications
industries supporting such reform for their own reasons. 195
Differences in the reasons motivating Democrats’ and Republicans’ calls for Section 230
reform may leave little common ground for agreement, 196 although calls for greater transparency
regarding the content of online platforms’ content moderation policies may offer some basis for a

193. Adi Robertson, Mark Zuckerberg just told Congress to upend the internet, VERGE (Oct. 29, 2020), https://
www.theverge.com/2020/10/29/21537040/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-section-230-hearing-reform-pact-act-big-tech.
194. Joan Marsh, The Neutrality Debate We Need to Have, AT&T PUB. POL’Y (Aug. 21, 2020), https://
www.attpublicpolicy.com/fcc/the-neutrality-debatewe-need-to-have/.
195. David McCabe, IBM, Marriott and Mickey Mouse Take on Tech’s Favorite Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/technology/section-230-lobby.html.
196. See supra note 122-124 and accompanying text.
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compromise solution.197 The takedowns that occurred in the aftermath of the enactment of
SESTA and FOSTA198 lend some credibility to predictions that limiting Section 230’s scope
would lead to less posting of Internet content. 199
2.

Antitrust Reform

Big tech firms are facing a similarly challenging position with respect to antitrust, with
Google, Facebook, Apple, and Amazon becoming targets of the antitrust reform movement. 200
Interestingly, the Ranking Member of the House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and
Administrative Law has attempted to draw a link between possible reforms of antitrust and
Section 230, arguing that antitrust reform is the only way to curb supposed discrimination in
content moderation.201
Although the 2020 House Staff proposed a number of general changes to antitrust that
were not specific to big tech, 202 the current raft of proposals reported by the House Judiciary

197. Nandita Bose & David Shepardson, Senators propose reform to key U.S. tech liability shield, REUTERS
(Jun. 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tech-section-230/ senators-propose-reform-to-key-u-s-techliability-shield-idUSKBN23V2V3 (discussing the Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act, or
PACT Act, co-sponsored by Democratic Senator Brian Schatz and Senate Republican John Thune, which would
require tech platforms to explain their content moderation practices).
198. Aja Romano, A new law intended to curb sex trafficking threatens the future of the internet as we know it,
VOX (July 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/4/13/17172762/fosta-sesta-backpage-230-internet-freedom.
199. Derek E. Bambauer, What does the day after Section 230 reform look like?, BROOKINGS (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/what-does-the-day-after-section-230-reform-look-like/ (“The first and most
predictable effect of a diminution of Section 230 will be a wave of litigation . . . . [T]he second immediate effect is
likely that internet sites will become much more cautious about content.”).
200. Nicole Goodkind, Congress targets tech giants Apple, Google, Amazon, and Facebook in new series of
antitrust laws, FORTUNE (Jun. 11, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/06/11/congress-targets-tech-giants-apple-googleamazon-and-facebook-in-new-series-of-antitrust-laws/.
201. Aaron Schaffer, The Technology 202: GOP divisions threaten the bipartisan efforts to pass antitrust
legislation, WASH. POST (Jun. 17, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 2021/06/17/technology-202gop-divisions-threaten-bipartisan-efforts-pass-antitrust-legislation/.
202. CICILLINE REPORT, supra note 168, at 383-86, 390-404.
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Committee on June 24, 2021, largely target “online platforms.” 203 The lack of direct applicability
to ISPs have led them to remain unsurprisingly silent about the legislation.
ISPs’ reticence to get involved does carry some risk. Logical consistency with network
providers’ arguments in favor of technological neutrality when criticizing ISP-specific state
privacy laws and net neutrality would support adopting a similar stance with respect to antitrust.
Moreover, telecommunications firms have been active in merger markets in the past 204 and have
been the not-infrequent target of enforcement activity, evidenced most recently by AT&T’s
short-lived acquisition of Time Warner.205 Criticisms from some quarters that the current
proposals do not include ISPs206 creates some possibility that the bills may expand to include
network providers as well, which would of course broaden the scope of the firms concerned
about this issue.
C.

AREAS WHERE ISPS HAVE MORE AT STAKE

At the same time, other issues exist in which ISPs have more skin in the game than big
tech. Three areas in particular loom the largest: spectrum policy, pole attachments, and net
neutrality. Notably, the more technical nature of these first two of these topics place them further
from the public eye than the third. In each case, big tech’s interests are not completely opposed

203. Four of the five bills reported by the House Judiciary Committee apply only to online platform, which by
definition can only be “a website, online or mobile application, digital assistant, or online service.” H.R. 3816, 117th
Cong. § 2(g)(10) (2021); H.R. 3825, 1117th Cong. § 5(10) (2021); H.R. 3826, 117th Cong. § 3(h) (2021); H.R.
3849, 117th Cong. § 5(12) (2021). The sole exception is the bill on merger filing fees, which applies to all firms.
H.R. 3843, 117th Cong. (2021).
204. Jean-Christophe Lebraud & Peter Karlströmer, The future of M&A in telecom, MCKINSEY & CO. (2011)
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/ client_service/Telecoms/PDFs/M_A.ashx.
205. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (upholding the district court’s rejection of
the federal government’s challenge to AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner).
206. Karl Bode, Recent Antitrust Push Is Weirdly Narrow, Pretends Telecom and Banking Don’t Exist,
TECHDIRT (June 17, 2021, 5:54 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210615/ 07412446992/recent-antitrustpush-is-weirdly-narrow-pretends-telecom-banking-dont-exist.shtml; Katharine Trendacosta, When It Comes to
Antitrust, It’s All Connected, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/
when-it-comes-antitrust-its-all-connected.

36

to those of the ISPs. In addition, there are some areas in which the interests of different types of
ISPs diverge.
1.

Spectrum

Wireless broadband is the most rapidly growing segment of the industry, and satisfying
this burgeoning demand depends on access to ever-increasing amounts of spectrum. The need for
more spectrum unifies all actors in this space. Network providers and big tech firms all need
spectrum to provide service to their customers. The incentive auction even allowed struggling
broadcasters to benefit from mobile broadband’s rise.207
That said, key industry segments line up somewhat differently with respect to the best
way to deploy spectrum. Traditional wireless providers, such as AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile,
have staked their future to 5G and are lobbying for additional allocations of licensed spectrum to
support its deployment.208 Big tech firms like Google and ISPs like Comcast that to date have
largely foregone significant investments in licensed spectrum tend to support allocating
increasing amounts to unlicensed spectrum. 209
2.

Pole Attachments

In addition to spectrum, firms looking to deploy 5G networks need access to locations
where they can locate their small cells. On the one hand, traditional wireless firms embrace pole

207. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
208. Comments of CTIA at 1, Unlicensed Use of the 6 GHz Band, Report and Ordre and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 35 FCC Rcd. 3852 (2020) (ET Docket No. 18-295) (submitted Feb. 15, 2019), https://
api.ctia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/190215-FINAL-CTIA-Comments-on-6-GHz-NPRM.pdf.
209. Jay Peters, Google is trying to test a secret 6 GHz network in 17 different states, VERGE (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/17/21372797/google-fcc-test-6ghz-network-17-states; Reply Comments of
Comcast Corporation at 1, Use of the 5.850-5.925 GHz Band, First Report and Order, Further Notice off Proposed
Rulemaking, and Order of Proposed Modification, 35 FCC Rcd. 13440 (2020) (ET Docket No. 19-138) (submitted
Apr. 27, 2020), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/104282788322240/200427%20Comcast%205.9%20GHz%20Reply%20
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attachment reforms that made it easier to deploy new network infrastructure. 210 Their position
was initially supported by Google to facilitate its deployment of Google Fiber, 211 although
questions about the future of this initiative may cause its position to change. Wireline ISPs that
are not deploying wireless networks have opposed these reforms because of the additional
burdens they impose and concerns that new entrants eager to deploy as quickly as possible will
pay too little attention to preventing the disruption of service to existing customers. 212
The real schism on this issue lies between those deploying new networks and incumbents
that are providing service through existing technologies, with the former including the telephone
industry and the latter consisting primarily of the cable industry. Indeed, the history of pole
attachments reveals the extent to which each firm’s position is contingent on its construction
plans. Cable was the primary beneficiary of the Pole Attachments Act during the industry’s early
years,213 but its position has reversed now that its networks are fully deployed.
3.

Net Neutrality

The positions of the different segments of the industry have shifted over time. Net
neutrality has been critically important to ISPs throughout the course of the debate. Big tech’s
relationship with net neutrality has been more complex. During the beginning years of the
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debate, first Microsoft and then Google represented net neutrality’s strongest advocates. This
began to change in the lead up to the 2010 Open Internet Order, when Google and Verizon
brokered a deal in which both firms would support the imposition of net neutrality on wired
broadband in exchange for lighter touch regulation of wireless broadband. 214 Netflix took over as
primary advocate during the debates leading up to the 2015 Open Internet Order. 215 When the
2018 Restoring Internet Freedom Order abolished net neutrality, big tech companies opposed the
decision and began to advocate for legislation to stabilize the situation. 216
Big tech companies have drawn frequent criticism for the tepidness of their support for
net neutrality.217 This perception is far from illusory: Netflix’s CEO has acknowledged that net
neutrality is “not our primary battle at this point” for the simple reason that “we’re big enough to
get the deals we want.”218 The same conclusion was drawn by Tim Wu, the scholar credited with
coining the phrase, net neutrality, and is currently serving as special advisor to the president for
technology and competition policy, who has acknowledged that big tech companies “have mixed
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motives in their area” and now that they have achieved scale, “it’s to some degree to their
advantage to climb up the ladder and pull it up after them.” 219
Critics are also drawing an analogy between net neutrality and the extent to which big
tech companies possess market power and prioritize their own content. 220 At the same time, big
tech companies are becoming significant network operators in their own right, building widearea networks that cover most continents and becoming the largest constructors of undersea
cables in the world.221 They have largely chosen to operate these as private networks, primarily
to avoid the regulatory burdens of the type associated with net neutrality. 222
The softening of big tech’s position on net neutrality suggests the possibility of finding
some common ground. That said, any legislation that is not sufficiently protective of net
neutrality runs the risk of generating significant political backlash.
D.

POLITICAL OBSTACLES

Our brief review has identified a number of issues that could form the basis for a political
bargain sufficient to support enactment of a new communications statute. Aside from the
substance of such a political deal, considerable obstacles remain to its possible enactment.
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First and foremost is the focus of the Biden Administration. To its credit, it has
maintained a laser-like focus on seven priorities: COVID-19, climate, racial equity, the economy,
health care, immigration, and restoring America’s global standing. 223 Aside from the inclusion of
rural broadband funding in the infrastructure bill, none of the priorities identified here appear to
fall within this list.
The second is the high level of partisanship in the current Congress. For only the third
time in U.S. history, the Senate is equally divided between the two major parties, with Vice
President Kamala Harris providing the casting vote to break ties. 224 The Democrats’ majority in
the House of Representatives is larger but sufficiently thin to limit the prospects for major
legislative reform.225 The loss of a majority in either chamber in the midterm elections would
make these possibilities even more remote. That said, the bipartisan nature of the support for the
infrastructure bill and for antitrust reform suggest that this problem may not be insuperable.
Finally, combining the substantive elements discussed above into a single piece of
legislation would be complicated by the fact that different provisions fall within the jurisdiction
of different congressional committees. Specifically, classic telecommunications issues such as
universal service, intermediary immunity, spectrum policy, pole attachments, and net neutrality
fall within the ambit of the commerce committees, while the judiciary committees bear
responsibility for privacy and antitrust. The involvement of two sets of committee leaders and
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members will no doubt make the difficult process of enacting major legislative reform even
harder.
V.

CONCLUSION

Politics is often described as the art of the possible. This pragmatic observation
underscores the importance of thinking about major reform legislation as more than just debates
over substantive issues but also about building coalitions of support. This approach provides
insights into the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and components and
potential paths that might lead to the passage of the next major communications statute.
Although predictions are hazardous, especially about the future, 226 we will venture some
thoughts on potential directions communications reform may take. In terms of political salience
and financial importance, the most important issue in play is antitrust reform. Although this issue
has the most relevance for big tech companies, it should interest every stakeholder, as all have a
strong interest in preserving the economically focused approach that currently animates antitrust
law, and they all no doubt plan to undertake mergers and engage in conduct that could be subject
to new antitrust rules that may be adopted.
In our judgment, the second most important issue is privacy. Although the big tech firms
currently rely the most on advertising, many other stakeholders are exploring the possibility of
pursuing business models based on the use of data. In addition, the increasing number of state
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privacy statutes is raising the real possibility that every stakeholder may face a legal environment
that is badly fragmented.
Although the ISPs share a degree of interest in both these issues, net neutrality and
spectrum reform have bigger implications for their business models. And politicians appear to be
most interested in antitrust and Section 230 reform, although those most interested in antitrust
tend to advocate for outcomes that almost all of the key stakeholders would tend to resist.
Any enactment of communications reform legislation in the short run would depend on
whether any one proposal can cobble together enough interest a sufficient cross section of
stakeholders to induce them to support such a proposal. Many parties that in the past were
content with the status quo, or at least preferred sticking with it over assuming the risks that
come with opening up the whole can of worms, now appear to have motivation that may make
them more interested in some form of compromise.
Although these immediate concerns will determine whether such reform legislation could
be enacted in the near future, it is important not to make too much of the politics of the moment.
Major reform legislation is typically the process of years of deliberation. Thus, laying the
groundwork for reform legislation can serve important purposes regardless of the short-term
prospects.
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